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Abstract
Two variations of the McEliece cryptosystem are presented. The first is based on a
relaxation of the column permutation in the classical McEliece scrambling process. This is
done in such a way that the Hamming weight of the error, added in the encryption process,
can be controlled so that efficient decryption remains possible. The second variation is
based on the use of spatially coupled moderate-density parity-check codes as secret codes.
These codes are known for their excellent error-correction performance and allow for a
relatively low key size in the cryptosystem. For both variants the security with respect to
known attacks is discussed.
1 Introduction
Many widely-used public key cryptosystems, such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography,
can be broken by a large-scale quantum computer. It was pointed out in a report by National
Institute of Standards and Technology [1] that the building of powerful quantum computers
might well be feasible in a matter of 20 years and for this reason the report encourages
academics to come up with systems which might still be safe in an environment where
quantum computers exist.
One promising family of public key systems which are potentially secure in a post-
quantum computer environment are so called code-based cryptosystems, like theMcEliece [34]
and the Niederreiter [40] systems. These systems are based on the hardness of decoding a
random linear code, a problem that has so far proved resistant to quantum computer-aided
attacks. In both these cryptosystems the secret key is a code for which an efficient decoding
algorithm is known. The public key is a disguised version of the secret code that appears to
be a random code, thus hiding the structure that gives rise to efficient decoding.
The security of such a system is thus based on two assumptions. First, it is intractable
to decode the seemingly random public code with general decoding algorithms. Since
the best known algorithms for decoding random linear codes are exponential in the length
of the code [33, 7], this can in principle be achieved by increasing the size of the code.
However, this comes at the cost of a prohibitively large key size. The second assumption is
that it is impossible for an attacker to reconstruct or uncover the underlying structure of the
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secret code from the public code. This prevents the attacker from simply using the efficient
decoding algorithm herself.
The second assumption has held for McEliece’s original proposal, but has been proven
wrong for many later variants. McEliece [34] suggests a binary Goppa code as the effi-
ciently decodable secret key. The code is disguised through a random column permutation
of its generator matrix and left multiplication by a random invertible matrix. Encryption
consists of encoding a plaintext message with the public code and adding a random error
whose Hamming weight stays within the error-correcting bound of the secret code (which
is the same as the bound of the public code). An attacker would then have to correct this er-
ror in order to recover the plaintext. For a precise description of the McEliece cryptosystem
based on arbitrary efficiently decodable codes, see Section 3 of this paper.
To this day, the McEliece system remains unbroken – if its originally suggested size is
adjusted in order to defend against current computer power and incremental speed-ups in
decoding algorithms [10]. However, its major disadvantage is the large public key size of
the system. For this reason many attempts have been made to find alternatives to McEliece’s
original proposal using different underlying codes equipped with more compact representa-
tions, including both codes with algebraic structure like Reed-Solomon codes and modern
codes like low-density parity-check codes with quasi-cyclic structure.
In (almost) all these systems the masking of the secret code consists of a random per-
mutation and rescaling of the columns of a generator matrix along with left multiplication
by an invertible matrix. While the left multiplication is clearly just a change of basis of
the code, the column operations lead to a so-called monomially equivalent code. Since per-
muting and rescaling of codeword coordinates leave the Hamming weight invariant, these
operations can easily be dealt with when setting up the cryptosystem. On the downside, this
type of masking often leaves too much algebraic structure, which an attacker can exploit.
Indeed, in most cases the algebraic type of the code remains unchanged: for example,
a disguised generalized Reed-Solomon code is a generalized Reed-Solomon code. As a
consequence, the knowledge of the code class provides an attacker with further useful in-
formation. We give an overview of many proposed variants and attacks in Remark 2. The
only codes that appear to resist such an attack are alternant codes [10]. In Section 4 we
elaborate on the idea of Baldi et al. [3] by proposing a McEliece cryptosystem where the
monomial transformations are replaced by the inverses of (invertible) matrices whose rows
have Hamming weight m = 2. This generalization appears to have the advantage of anni-
hilating the algebraic structure of the secret code without leaving a trace for an attacker to
restore it using the distinguisher coming from the Schur square of the public code. Indeed,
our simulations show that the Schur square of the public code, a central tool in most at-
tacks, behaves like the Schur square of a random code. This contrasts the system proposed
by Baldi et al. [3] for which it has been shown [20] that the dimension of the Schur square
is not maximal when the average row weight m is less than 1+R.
As an alternative to improved masking in algebraic systems, in Section 5 we propose
the use of spatially coupled Moderate-Density Parity-Check (SC-MDPC) codes for the
McEliece cryptosystem. Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes were first considered
as candidates in [39], but were soon observed to be vulnerable to decoding attacks due to
the high density of low-weight codewords in the dual code; a brute force search for such
codewords allows attackers to generate a low-density parity-check matrix to efficiently de-
code the code. Furthermore, general LDPC-based McEliece cryptosystems suffer from
large key sizes, motivating quasi-cyclic LDPC (QC-LDPC) codes to be considered [5, 4].
For increased security, Moderate-Density Parity-Check (MDPC) codes were considered in
[36], and in particular, quasi-cyclic MDPC (QC-MDPC) codes. Most recently a new attack
on all classes of quasi-cyclic MDPC codes has appeared by Guo et al. [24], suggesting
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that the use of quasi-cyclic structure to reduce key size introduces a weakness in security.
Since spatially coupled codes are known for their efficient decoding, capacity approaching
performance, minimum distance properties, and compact representation [14, 38], the use of
these codes offers a promising variant of the cryptosystem. In particular, spatially coupled
codes offer a reduced key size without the security cost of rigid quasi-cyclic structure.
In order to check the vulnerability of our proposed systems with respect to brute-force
decoding, that is, information-set decoding, we compute the work factor for Stern’s al-
gorithm for some sets of parameters and secret generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes in
Section 4. Taking the reduced Hamming weight of the errors into account, we show that the
system can be made safe with respect to information-set decoding. Though the keys are still
large, our variation compares favorably with current post-quantum alternatives. Similarly,
in Section 5, we study the work factor for classical decoding attacks and key recover attacks
of the spatially coupled MDPC system. In both cases, our variation compares favorably to
comparable quasi-cyclic systems.
2 Coding-Theoretic Preliminaries
Let us recall some basic notions of coding theory. Throughout let F = Fq be a finite field
with q elements. We endow Fn with the Hamming weight wt(v1, . . . ,vn) := |{i | vi 6= 0}|.
The associated distance is denoted by d, thus d(v,w) := wt(v−w). An [n,k]q-code C is a
k-dimensional subspace of the metric space (Fn,d). The minimum distance of C is defined
as d(C )=min{wt(v) | v∈C \{0}}, and we call C an [n,k,d]q-code (resp. [n,k,≥ d]q-code)
if it is an [n,k]q-code with distance d (resp. at least d). Any [n,k]q-code C can be written in
either of the forms
C = im(G) := {uG | u ∈ Fk} and C = ker(H) := {v ∈ Fn | HvT = 0}
for some matrix G ∈ Fk×n (whose rows thus form a basis of C ) and some H ∈ F(n−k)×n.
We call any such matrix G a generator matrix and H a parity check matrix of C . Define
the dual of C ⊆ Fn as C⊥ := {w ∈ Fn | v ·w = 0 for all v ∈ C }, where w · v is the standard
dot product. Clearly, if C = im(G) = ker(H) as above, then C⊥ = im(H) = ker(G).
Let C be an [n,k,≥ d]q-code. The triangle inequality of the Hamming metric shows
that for any z ∈ Fn satisfying d(z,C ) := min{d(z,v) | v ∈ C } ≤ d−1
2
there exists a unique
codeword v ∈ C such that d(v,z) ≤ d−1
2
. Only codes where this unique codeword can
be found efficiently are suitable for error-correcting purposes. There exist various classes
of algebraic codes with efficient decoding algorithms, such as generalized Reed-Solomon
codes, BCH-codes, alternant codes, Reed-Muller codes, AG-codes. Moreover, graph-based
codes are equipped with low-complexity iterative decoders.
Code-based cryptography relies on the fact that decoding up to (d− 1)/2 errors with
respect to a random linear code is NP-hard; see [9]. Furthermore, the best known decod-
ing algorithms for a random linear code, known as information-set decoding, have time
complexity that is exponential in the length and rate.
One such algorithm is due to Stern [48], with a precursor given by Lee/Brickell in [28].
Stern’s algorithm aims at finding error vectors with weights p, p, 0 when restricted to cer-
tain index sets X ,Y, Z, respectively. Here X and Y are sets of size k/2, and Z has size ℓ.
The parameters p and ℓ need to be chosen as to optimize the average run time. A detailed
description of the algorithm for codes over arbitrary finite fields can be found in [44, Sec. 3]
by Peters. In the same paper, Peters also presents a work factor estimate. For F = Fq with
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q= 2m and the chosen parameters p and ℓ this results in
W˜ binp,ℓ = mSp,ℓ
(
n
r
)[(
k/2
p
)2(
n− k− ℓ
r−2p
)]−1
binary operations, (1)
where
Sp,ℓ := (n− k)
2(n+ k)+
[
k/2− p+1+2
(
k/2
p
)
(q−1)p
]
ℓ
+
2pq(r−2p+1)(2q−3)(q−1)2p−2
qℓ
(
k/2
p
)2
.
The parameters p and ℓ have to be determined to minimize W˜ binp,ℓ . The effort can be fur-
ther reduced by making wise use of computations in a previous round of the iterations.
We refer to [10] by Bernstein et al. and [44] by Peters for further details and remark that
this re-using of earlier computations is an extension of an original improvement by Can-
teaut/Chabaud [12]. An additional improvement of Stern’s algorithm has been proposed
by Finiasz/Sendrier [22]; see also [44, Sec. 6] for arbitrary finite fields. It is interesting
to note that in [13], Canto Torres/Sendrier develop a framework which includes all known
variants of information set decoding for generic linear codes, and show that all variants of
information set decoding that fit within this framework will have asymptotically identical
cost when the error rate is sublinear. Thus new information set decoding algorithms that
fall within this framework will not significantly change the security of McEliece and its
variants.
3 The McEliece Cryptosystem
In this section we recall the general set-up for the McEliece cryptosystem and discuss its
vulnerability for various choices of underlying codes. The central feature is a code that
comes with an efficient decoding algorithm. As before, let F= Fq. We set
Gq,n,k,t =
{
(C ,D)
∣∣∣∣ C ⊆ Fn,dim(C ) = k, dist(C )≥ 2t+1,D efficient t-error decoding algorithm for C
}
. (2)
In this terminology, the public key of the cryptosystem is simply the code C , and the decod-
ing algorithm D is kept secret. Usually, a code is specified by a generator or parity check
matrix and knowing an efficient decoding algorithm is equivalent to knowing a particularly
structured generator or parity check matrix for the code. In that case the pair (C ,D) above
may be replaced with G or H , where the latter are such a generator or parity check matrix.
The public key will then be a sufficiently general and unstructured generator or parity check
matrix of a related code. Such a matrix may be obtained by a sufficient scrambling of the
structured matrix. This is the version described below.
Let GLn(F) := {M ∈ F
n×n | det(M) 6= 0} be the general linear group and define
Mn := {P ∈ GLn(F) | P monomial matrix}, (3)
where a square matrix is called monomial if every row and column contains exactly one
nonzero element. In other words, monomial matrices are exactly the products of permu-
tation matrices and nonsingular diagonal matrices. Clearly, Mn is a subgroup of GLn(F).
Monomial matrices can be characterized in the following way. For any P ∈ GLn(F) we
have
P is monomial⇐⇒
{
the isomorphism: Fn −→ Fn, x 7−→ xP
preserves the Hamming weight.
}
(4)
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This property plays a central role in code-based cryptosystems because monomial matrices
will act on error vectors and therefore do not change the weight of such vectors. This is
necessary in the following algorithm so that the legitimate receiver can indeed decode the
received cyphertext. We fix a field F and parameters k,n and assume these data are known
to the public.
Construction 1. McEliece Cryptosystem [34]
(1) Pick a parameter t and a pair (C ,D) ∈ Gq,n,k,t . Suppose C is given by the generator
matrix G ∈ Fk×n, which gives rise to the decoding algorithm D correcting at least t
errors.
(2) Pick random matrices S ∈ GLk(F) and P ∈Mn and set G¯ := SGP
−1.
(3) Public Key: (G¯, t).
Secret Key: (S,G,P).
(4) Plaintext Space: Z := Fk.
(5) Encryption: Encrypt the plaintext m∈Z into c :=mG¯+e, where e∈Fn is a randomly
chosen vector of weight at most t.
(6) Decryption:
• Compute c′ := cP =mSG+ eP.
• Decode c′ with the decoding algorithm D for C and denote the output by m′.
• Return m′S−1.
Some comments are in order. Step (2) serves to mask the specific generator matrix G.
Note that left multiplication by S does not change the code generated by G, whereas right
multiplication by P only mildly changes the code and usually leaves the type of code invari-
ant (such as GRS, alternant, or Reed-Muller). In (5) it is most secure to choose e of weight
as large as possible in order to minimize an attacker’s success when using information-set
decoding. As for (6) we know that d(c′, imG) ≤ wt(eP) ≤ t. Thus the codeword mSG is
actually the unique closest codeword to c′ and therefore applying the decoding algorithm
to c′ will return m′ = mS. Hence m′S−1 is indeed the plaintext m.
Remark 1. A cryptosystem dual to the McEliece system is the Niederreiter system [40].
It is based on a (scrambled) parity check matrix. We refer to [40] or [30, Sec. II.B] for a
detailed description. In [30] Li et al. showed that the McEliece system is equivalent to the
Niederreiter system [40] if based on the same underlying code. This implies in particular
that if one system can be broken then so can the other. However, the Niederreiter system has
actually some crucial advantages. Firstly, it allows the public key to be given in systematic
form without loss of security, resulting in a reduction of key size and a reduction of work
factor for the encryption process. Thus, while for the McEliece system over the field F2m the
public key has size mkn bits, it can be reduced to mk(n−k) bits for the Niederreiter system.
Secondly, the McEliece system is actually more vulnerable than the Niederreiter system to
a specific type of attack. Indeed, encrypting the same message twice with the McEliece
system will most likely result in different error vectors being added, and the difference of
the two cyphertexts provides useful information to an attacker who has the chance to use
the same message twice. Finally, the Niederreiter system can be used to construct digital
signature schemes [15].
Let us now discuss some crucial details concerning the security of the McEliece cryp-
tosystem and its variants. As discussed above, an attacker can either attempt to break the
system by using general decoding algorithms, without using any potential special structure
of the random-seeming public code, or can attempt to uncover and exploit the structure that
leads to an efficient decoding algorithm. The second approach has led to breaks of most
proposed variants. We briefly outline the most prominent cases and successful attacks.
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Remark 2.
(a) Reed-Solomon and Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes were proposed as a way
to reduce key size in the McEliece system by Niederreiter [40]. However, Sidel-
nikov/Shestakov [47] showed that one can efficiently recover a structured parity-check
matrix for the Niederreiter system from the public matrix.
(b) Berger/Loidreau [8] proposed using subcodes of GRS codes, but Wieschebrink [52]
extended the Sidelnikov/Shestakov attack to break this system for almost all parame-
ters. This attack is the first one based on Schur products, to be discussed later in this
paper. For the same codes, Couvreur at el. [16] derived a nested sequence of subcodes
– called a filtration – that expose their vulnerability. Again this attack makes use of the
Schur product. In particular, it leads to an attack of GRS based cryptosystems that is
different from the one in [47].
(c) Wieschebrink [52] suggested GRS codes with a certain number of random columns
inserted. However, using that shortening a GRS code results in a GRS code and com-
paring the dimensions of certain Schur products, Couvreur et al. [16] could identify
the random positions and recover the structure of the secret code.
(d) Sidelnikov [46] proposed binary Reed-Muller codes, but that has been proven insecure
by Minder/Shokrollahi [35].
(e) Janwa/Moreno [25] suggested algebraic-geometric codes, but this has been broken by
Couvreur/Marquez-Corbella/Pellikaan [17]. The latter derived a t-error-correcting
pair with the aid of a filtration that in turn is based on Schur products. The same au-
thors also extended their attack to cryptosystems based on subcodes of AG-codes [18].
(f) Monico et al. [39] proposed LDPC codes for the McEliece system. The code structure
was disguised by a sparse invertible matrix acting on the low density parity check
matrix. It was pointed out in the original paper that fairly large sizes would be required
so that a low density parity check structure cannot be recovered. To avoid this problem
medium density parity check (MDPC) codes were proposed by Baldi et. al. [5]. Quasi-
cyclic (QC) LDPC codes are preferred over general LDPC for their smaller key size,
but some classes of QC-LDPC codes and QC-MDPC codes were successfully attacked
by Otmani et al. [41] and more recently by Guo et. al. [24]. More general MDPC
codes are still promising, as we will discuss in Section 5.
(g) Bernstein et al. [11] suggested wild Goppa codes (that is, Goppa codes with Goppa
polynomial γq−1 for some irreducible polynomial γ) due to their better error-correcting
properties. A filtration-type attack based on Schur products has been derived in [19]
by Couvreur et al. for the case where the Goppa polynomial comes from a quadratic
extension. An additional attack on wild Goppa McEliece was developed in [21] by
Faugere et al.
(h) Baldi et al. [3] suggested variants of the McEliece cryptosystem, including adding
a rank-1 matrix to the monomial matrix in Step (2). This forces an extra round in
the decryption which in essence amounts to testing all values of the underlying field.
In [16] Couvreur et al. presented an attack based on Schur products. They determined
a specific subspace of the public code with codimension one from which the secret
code can be identified with the aid of Wieschebrink’s attack [52]. One should note
that adding a rank-1 matrix to the monomial matrix leads to a public code that is not
monomially equivalent to the secret code anymore, and thus in general is not in the
same code class. However, it is exactly this rank-1 property that provides too much
structure and thus aids an attacker.
Another idea is to replace the permutation matrix in the monomial transformation with
a matrix whose inverse has an average row weight of m where 1< m << n. This idea
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probably goes back to Baldi et al. [4] who studied this idea in the context of McEliece
versions of LDPC codes. Baldi et al. [3] further elaborated this idea by using values
of m in the range 1 < m < 2 in the disguising of generalized Reed Solomon codes.
For these systems Couvreur et. al. [20] developed a polynomial time attack which
works best when the average row weight m is less than 1+ R where R is the code
rate. A similar idea has been employed before in the context of rank-metric codes
by Gabidulin et al. [23] but as in the rank-metric coding setting vulnerabilities were
discovered by these subcode constructions. See Overbeck [42] for details.
A remaining class of codes that seems to be efficiently decodable and at the same time
secure for cryptosystems is subfield-subcodes, such as alternant codes or, more specifically,
Goppa codes. The latter are in fact the ones originally suggested by McEliece [34]. The
reason is that for these codes the generator matrix G chosen in Step (1) of Construction 1
is itself already highly unstructured. Therefore its scrambled version G has – to this day
– fended off any attack for recovering the original code. As a consequence, an attacker
can only resort to decoding the random looking public code. Choosing sufficiently large
parameters n,k, any desired security level can be reached; see [10] for latest details on the
Goppa code case. However, the disadvantage of this choice is the prohibitively large key
size.
Many of the above listed attacks, resulting in an error-correcting pair, amount to com-
puting a nested sequence of subcodes of the public code based on certain Schur products.
This strategy relies on the facts that, firstly, the Schur square of GRS and other AG-codes
is of much lower dimension than those of a random code, and, secondly, that the attacker
knows the algebraic type of the secret code.
We now introduce the Schur product and Schur square and further discuss their impor-
tance.
Definition 1. For x = (x1, . . . ,xn), y = (y1, . . . ,yn) ∈ F
n define the star product as x∗ y :=
(x1y1, . . . ,xnyn). For two codes C1, C2 ⊆ F
n define the Schur product as
C1 ∗C2 := spanF{x∗ y | x ∈ C1, y ∈ C2}.
We set C (2) := C ∗C and call it the Schur square of C .
Clearly, the star product is commutative and bilinear. Moreover, if the code C ⊆ Fn has
basis g1, . . . ,gk, then
C
(2) = span
F
{gi ∗g j | i= 1, . . . ,k, j = i, . . . ,k}, (5)
and thus, dim(C (2))≤min
{(
k+1
2
)
, n
}
. One even has the following generic result.
Proposition 1 ([32, Prop. 2]). Let n>
(
k+1
2
)
and C be a randomly chosen [n,k]-code. Then
Prob
(
dim(C (2)) =
(
k+1
2
))
= 1.
However, for a GRS code C the dimension of C (2) is actually much smaller. Indeed,
a k-dimensional GRS code is given by a generator matrix of the form G = (α ijz j) ∈ F
k×n
for distinct elements α1, . . . ,αn ∈ F and nonzero elements z1, . . . ,zn ∈ F
∗. Denoting the
resulting code by GRSn,k(α ,z) one easily verifies that
GRSn,k(α ,z)∗GRSn,k′(α ,z
′) = GRSn,k+k′−1(α ,z∗ z
′). (6)
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Thus we have
dim
(
GRSn,k(α ,z)
(2)
)
=min{2k−1, n}. (7)
This almost trivial fact aids an attacker if the cryptosystems are based on GRS codes. In
order to see this, one first observes that the Schur square of the secret code and that of the
public code are closely related due to the following trivial property of the star product:
for any x, y ∈ Fn and P ∈Mn we have (xP)∗ (yP) = (x∗ y)P˜, (8)
where P˜ is the monomial matrix
(
(Pi, j)
2
)
, i.e., each entry of P is squared. As a conse-
quence, using the bilinearity of ∗ we obtain im(G¯)(2) = im(G)(2)P˜−1 for the data as in
Construction 1 (and where again P˜−1 is the matrix P−1 with each nonzero entry squared).
This enables an attacker to make use of the public code in order to compute the Schur
square of the underlying secret code – up to the monomial matrix P˜: by Proposition 1 and
Identity (7) she can immediately distinguish the public code from a random code. As men-
tioned in Remark 2, this is often sufficient to successfully attack the system. In particular, it
breaks systems based on GRS codes or AG-codes (the latter for a wide set of parameters).
In the next sections we present two new variations of the McEliece cryptosystem. The
first one uses the idea of generalizing the monomial matrix to enhance the masking as
described in Remark 2(h) but where we use row weight m = 2. The other proposes the
use of a special class of MDPC codes that have reduced key size and are not quasi-cyclic,
thereby avoiding attacks designed for quasi-cyclic codes.
4 Variation Based on Weight-2 Masking
Recall the sets (2) and (3). We first propose the following variant of the McEliece cryp-
tosystem. It differs from the classical Construction 1 in that we replace the set Mn of
monomial matrices by the set
Wn := {P ∈ GLn(F) | each row of P has weight 2}. (9)
Notice that matrices of the form In+P, where P ∈Mn are in Wn with high probability. In
fact, Sage simulations show that for q = n = 28 this probability is at least 96%, whereas
for q= n= 29 it even goes up to 98%. This allows one to easily create matrices in Wn. As
we will demonstrate, using matrices from Wn instead of Mn leads to an improved masking
of the secret code at the cost of restricting the size of errors to half the original correctable
error-size.
Remark 3. We note that the results that follow remain valid if we extend the set Wn to the
set of invertible matrices where all rows have weight at most 2 and almost all of them have
weight equal to 2.
Construction 2. Variant of McEliece Cryptosystem – Weight-2 Masking
(1) Pick a parameter t and a pair (C ,D) ∈ Gq,n,k,t and choose a generator matrix G for C ,
which gives rise to the decoding algorithm D .
(2) Pick random matrices S ∈ GLk(F) and P ∈Wn and set G¯ := SGP
−1.
(3) Public Key: (G¯, t).
Secret Key: (S,G,P).
(4) Plaintext Space: Z := Fk.
(5) Encryption: Encrypt the plaintext m∈Z into c :=mG¯+e, where e∈Fn is a randomly
chosen vector such that wt(e)≤ t/2.
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(6) Decryption:
• Compute c′ := cP =mSG+ eP.
• Decode c′ using the decoding algorithm D for C and denote the output by m′.
• Return m′S−1.
Note that, in contrast with the original McEliece system, the matrix P is not mono-
mial, but rather in Wn. The definition of this set implies wt(eP) ≤ 2wt(e) for any e ∈ F
n,
and thus the condition on the error vector e guarantees that wt(eP) ≤ t. Therefore, as for
Construction 1, decoding of c′ = mSG+ eP yields the correct m′ = mS. In order to make
information-set decoding harder one should choose wt(e) = t/2 or at least close to it.
Remark 4. Just as for the classical system, one can easily formulate a Niederreiter analog
for this variant. In this case the secret parity check matrix H ∈ F(n−k)×n is transformed
to the public key H¯ := S−1HPT with S ∈ GLn−k(F) and P ∈ Wn randomly chosen. One
may actually choose S such that H¯ is in systematic form to reduce the public key size. The
plaintext space is Z := {m ∈ Fn | wt(m)≤ t/2} and the encryption of m ∈Z is given by
cT := H¯mT. Then one easily checks that decryption works in exactly the same way as for
the Niederreiter classical system. We omit further details.
It appears that multiplication by the matrix P−1 removes any identifiable algebraic struc-
ture from the public code. It changes the code type, since transforming G into GP−1 does
not amount to a permutation and rescaling of the columns. Note that in general the matrix
P−1 is not even sparse for P ∈Wn.
The loss of algebraic structure becomes clear when computing the Schur square C¯ (2) of
the public code C¯ = im(G¯). The simple identity (8) no longer holds, and the Schur square
of the public code appears quite unrelated to the Schur square of the secret code. If we
use a GRS code with 2k− 1 < n, this can also be confirmed with the dimension of C¯ (2).
Identity (7) tells us that whenever the dimension of C¯ (2) is bigger than 2k− 1, the public
code C¯ is not a GRS code. Similarly, a sufficiently large dimension of the Schur square
precludes that the public code is an AG-code (with a certain range of parameters) thanks to
[17, Prop. 8]. In fact, the following data suggest that the Schur square of the public code
behaves as that of a random code.
Example 1. Sage simulations for the parameters q= n as in Example 3 below and various
values of k (with 100 simulations for each chosen set of parameters) show that masking a
secret GRS code with a random matrix from Wn results in a Schur square of the public code
with the following properties.
(1) The Schur square of im(G¯) attains maximum dimension, i.e., min
{(
k+1
2
)
,n
}
.
(2) The Schur square of randomly taken subspaces of im(G¯) attains maximum dimension.
(3) The Schur square of the orthogonal code im(G¯)⊥ attains maximum dimension.
These maximum dimensions occurred in all simulations and thus we conjecture that the
above properties appear with probability 1. In other words, with respect to the Schur
square, the public code, its subcodes and its dual appear to behave like random codes, see
Proposition 1. This is underscored by a recent result by Weger in [51, p.45, Cor. 4] who
proved that for fixed [n,k] the probability that the Schur square of im(G¯), where G is a
generator matrix of an [n,k]-GRS code, tends to 1 as the field size q goes to infinity. An
analogous statement is true for the Niederreiter system [51, p. 49, Cor. 8]. Finally, we wish
to add that the masking used in Baldi et al. [3] using transformations having average row
weight m with 1< m< 2 transforms a GRS code into a code whose Schur square does not
have full rank, see [20].
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Example 2. Let Hq be the Hermitian curve with affine model given by
Hq : x
q+ x= yq+1.
The projective curve Hq has a single point at infinity, is smooth of genus g=
q(q−1)
2
and has
q3+ 1 points over Fq2 . This is the largest number of points possible over Fq2 for a curve
of this genus under the Weil bound, making Hq a Fq2-maximal curve. In fact, Hq has the
largest genus possible for a Fq2-maximal curve. AG-codes on Hermitian curves have been
widely studied [31, 49] because these codes may have length up to n = q3 with alphabet
Fq2 .
Let Hq(Fq2) be the set of points on Hq defined over Fq2 , and let P∞ denote the unique
point at ∞. Let P = (P1,P2, . . . ,Pn), where Pi ∈ Hq(Fq2) \{P∞} for 1 ≤ i ≤ q
3. Let E be
the divisor aP∞, where a is any natural number with 2g− 2 < a < q
3. The one-point AG-
code Ca =CL(Hq,P,E) (see [49, Section 8.3] and [17, 18]) is a code of length n = q
3,
dimension k = a+1−g, and minimum distance d ≥ q3−a [49, Proposition 8.3.3].
The Schur square of the code Ca is exactly the code C2a, which has dimension k
∗ =
min{n,2a+1−g}. Thus if 2a+1−g < n, a Hermitian code Ca can be distinguished from
a random code of equal dimension using the Schur square.
Sage simulations were carried out on masked Hermitian codes for the following param-
eter sets:
• The curve H4, with a = 20, a = 25, and a = 30, where the code Ca is defined over
F16, with length n = 64 in all cases. The code Ca has dimension k = 15, k = 20, and
k = 25 respectively.
• The curve H5, with a = 20, a = 30, and a = 40, where the code Ca is defined over
F25, with length n= 125 in all cases. The code Ca has dimension k= 11, k= 21, and
k = 31 respectively.
In each case, the code was masked with a random matrix from Wn and the dimension of the
Schur square of the masked code was computed in 100 trials. In all cases, the Schur square
of im(G¯) attains maximum dimension, i.e., min
{(
k+1
2
)
,n
}
. Thus the algebraic structure
appears to be well-hidden for Hermitian codes as well.
Summarizing, it appears that the vulnerability of our variants depends mainly on the
success of direct decoding attacks. We close this section with the following work factor
estimates.
Example 3. We consider the proposed variant of the McEliece cryptosystem and the Nieder-
reiter dual (see Remark 4) based on GRS codes with parameters [q,n,k] as in the table be-
low. The public key size is given in bytes and we estimate the work factor for Stern decoding
with the aid of (1), and where r is the number of errors to be corrected (the work factor for
the Lee-Brickell algorithm [28] is higher in each case and thus omitted). For an [n,k]-GRS
code we have t = (n− k)/2 and thus we may add r = t/2 errors in the encryption. The
estimate for W˜ binp,ℓ is the minimum over all possible values for p and ℓ.
[q,n,k] key size McEliece key size Niederreiter W˜ binp,ℓ for r = ⌊t/2⌋
[28, 28, 27] 32,768 16,384 253
[29, 450, 230] 116,437 56,925 281
[29, 470, 240] 126,900 62,100 283
[29, 29, 200] 115,200 70,200 282
[29, 29, 250] 144,000 73,687 288
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Let us put these numbers into context. After an optimized attack on the classical McEliece
system based on binary Goppa codes, Bernstein et al. [10] recommended a binary Goppa
code of size at least [n,k] = [1632,1269] (based on a Goppa polynomial in F211 [x] of de-
gree t = 33). This leads to a key size of 57,580 bytes if used with the Niederreiter system.
Only this size guarantees an 80-bit security (i.e., a work factor for their attack with at least
280 binary operations), see [10]. Note that RSA-1024, having 80-bit security, has a key
size of 256 bytes. It seems likely that a similar optimization of Stern’s algorithm plus ad-
ditional software speedups as in [10] reduces the according work factors in above table.
More recently, further improvements of Stern’s algorithm have been presented by Becker
et al. [7] and May et al. [33], but as in [10] they are tailored to binary codes. It is left to
future research whether their results can be generalized to our case in order to lower the
work factor even further. Notwithstanding further reductions, it appears that our proposed
system compares quite well to the binary [1632,1269]-Goppa code.
5 AVariation Based on Spatially CoupledMDPCCodes
In this section, we examine the use of a class of spatially coupled moderate density parity-
check (SC-MDPC) codes for the McEliece cryptosystem. Spatially coupled codes are
known for their capacity-approaching performance and improved decoding thresholds (i.e.
lowest channel quality where error correction is possible) [27]. As noted in Remark 2, low
density codes and some quasi-cyclic codes are vulnerable to attack. While the decoding per-
formance of general MDPC codes decreases as density increases, spatially coupled codes
typically have the opposite effect [27]. We note further that spatially coupled codes may be
obtained using several methods (e.g., [45], [2]). Our focus will be on the construction of
SC-MDPC codes using MDPC convolutional codes, specifically terminated convolutional
codes arising from quasi-cyclic MDPC codes. For background on terminated convolutional
codes arising from quasi-cyclic codes, we refer the reader to [29, 50]. The resulting SC-
MDPC code may be represented using a bipartite Tanner graph [26] and decoded using
standard message-passing belief propagation algorithms [43, 26]. This construction ap-
proach ensures that the resulting codes are not quasi-cyclic and yet still yield a smaller key
size than general MDPC codes.
Throughout this section let F = F2. We will use F[D]
r×n and F(D)r×n to denote the
space of r× n matrices with entries in F[D] and F(D), respectively. As before, GLr(F)
denotes the group of r× r invertible matrices with entries in F. For a polynomial f =
∑ni=0 fiD
i ∈ F[D] we define the weight of f as number of nonzero coefficients, thus wt( f ) =
|{i | fi 6= 0}|. Note that wt( f + g) ≤ wt( f ) +wt(g) and wt( f g) ≤ wt( f )wt(g) for all
polynomials f ,g. Furthermore, we recall the notion of a circulant matrix. For a vector
a= (a1, . . . ,am) ∈ F
m denote by Ca ∈ F
m×m the circulant matrix with i-th row given by the
cyclic shift (ai, . . . ,am,a1, . . . ,ai−1) for i= 1, . . . ,m. Moreover, we associate with a and Ca
the polynomial fa = ∑
m−1
i=0 ai+1D
i ∈ F[D].
LetH ∈Frm×mn be the parity check matrix of a QC-MDPC code, that is,H =(Cai j) i=1,...,r
j=1,...,n
,
where Cai j ∈ F
m×m are circulant matrices. We associate with it the polynomial matrix
H(D) = ( fi j) ∈ F[D]
r×n, where fi j := fai j is the polynomial associated with the circulant
Cai j . Then H(D) is a polynomial parity-check representation of a SC-MDPC code. It will
represent the private key in the McEliece cryptosystem. Let p,r be parameters such that
wt( fi j)≤ p and deg( fi j)≤ d for all i, j.
Let nowH ′(D)= TH(D) for some T ∈GLr(F). Then clearly, H
′(D) andH(D) have the
same row space. (It is assumed here that H(D) and H ′(D) have rank r. This is guaranteed
with high probability when the choice of the entries inH(D) are sufficiently random.) From
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the properties of the weight of polynomials it follows that wt( f ) ≤ rp and deg( f ) ≤ d for
all entries f of H ′(D).
Remark 5. More generally, one can use a non-singular matrix T (D) ∈ F[D]r×r having at
most t non-zero coefficients in each entry to make it harder for an eavesdropper to guess
the structure of H(D). However, the number of non-zero coefficients in each polynomial
entry of H ′(D) will be larger as a result, increasing the overall key size.
We now compute a specific generator matrix for H ′(D) in order to give an upper
bound for the key size of our public key. Recall that H(D) has rank r. Thus, without
loss of generality we may assume H ′(D) = [C(D) |M(D)], where C(D) ∈ F[D]r×r is non-
singular and M(D) denotes the last n− r columns of H ′(D). Then the matrix H ′′(D) :=
C(D)−1H ′(D) is of the form H ′′(D) = [I | P(D)], where P(D)= 1
det(C(D))Adj(C(D))M(D)∈
F(D)r×(n−r) and where Adj(C(D)) is the classical adjoint of the matrix C(D). Define
G′(D) := [P′(D)T | det(C(D)) · Ik], where k := n− r and P
′(D) = Adj(C(D))M(D). Then
clearly G′(D)H ′(D)T = 0 and thus G′(D) is a polynomial generator matrix for the code
with parity-check matrix H ′(D). Furthermore, it is easy to see that every entry f in G′(D)
satisfies wt( f )≤ r!(rp)r and deg( f )≤ dr.
We will use G′(D) for the public key. The number of distinct non-zero polynomial
entries of G′(D) is r(n− r)+ 1. Since the degree of each entry is at most dr, each non-
zero coefficient requires log2(d
r) bits to represent it, and thus the key size is (r(n− r)+
1)r!(rp)rr log2(d) bits.
Let d′ be the actual maximum degree among all entries in G′(D). A message to be
encrypted is represented in the form
m(D) = (m1(D),m2(D), . . . ,mk(D)) ∈ F[D]
k,
where deg(mi(D)) ≤ z− 1− d
′ for i = 1, . . . ,k for some chosen z. The message m(D) is
encoded as
c(D) = m(D)G′(D)+ e(D),
where e(D) = (e1(D) . . . ,en(D))∈ F[D]
n is an error polynomial with deg(ei(D))≤ z−1 for
all i and ∑ni=1wt(ei(D)) = t. The resulting SC-MDPC code has dimension approximately
k(z−d′−1), block length nz, and rate approximately k(z−d
′−1)
nz
.
The intended receiver takes an encrypted message c(D) and uses the graphical represen-
tation of H(D) (i.e., the private key) and the belief propagation algorithm to decode c(D).
The value of t in the choice of the error vector e(D) is such that t is close to the maximum
value for the belief propagation decoder on H(D) to recover the message m(D) with high
probability (e.g, probability 1−10−6).
Remark 6. Alternatively, one can use G′′(D) = SG′(D) as the public key, where S ∈
GLn−r(F) is a random matrix and is known as part of the private key. This will increase
the security of the system at the cost of an increase in key size.
We now summarize this variation of the McEliece cryptosystem.
Denote by Hn,m,r,z,d,t the set of all pairs (C ,T ), where C ⊆ F
mn is a QC-MDPC code
with circulant block size m and associated convolutional SC-MDPC code of dimension
k := n− r over F(D) and where T represents a Tanner graph of that code that can correct
up to t errors using a message passing decoder with memory (edge-spreading depth) d.
Here, z determines the length of the terminated SC-MDPC code.
Construction 3. Variant of McEliece Cryptosystem – SC-MDPC
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(1) Pick a parameter t and a pair (C ,T ) ∈Hn,m,r,z,d,t . Suppose C corresponds to parity-
check matrix H(D) ∈ F[D]r×n, which gives rise to the Tanner graph T .
(2) Pick a random T ∈GLr(F), and form H
′(D) = TH(D). Let G′(D) be a corresponding
generator matrix as described earlier with maximum degree d′ among its entries.
(3) Public Key: (G′(D), t,z,d′).
Secret Key: (T,H(D)).
(4) Plaintext Space: {(m1(D),m2(D), . . . ,mk(D)) ∈ F[D]
k | deg(mi(D))≤ z−1−d
′}.
(5) Encryption: Encrypt the plaintext m(D) into c(D) :=m(D)G′(D)+e(D), where e(D)∈
F2[D]
n is randomly chosen such that deg(ei(D))≤ z−1 for all i= 1, . . . ,n and ∑
n
i=1wt(ei(D))≤
t.
(6) Decryption: Decode c(D) using a belief propagation algorithm on the graphical rep-
resentation of H(D). Return the resulting output m(D).
We now assess the security of the SC-MDPC cryptosystem.
Classical decoding attacks: Because the published generator matrix G′(D) is denser
than H(D) and hides the underlying structure of the spatially coupled structure of the
code C , this system is not specifically compromised with respect to classical decoding
attacks like the information-set decoding described in [48]. Furthermore, the proposed sys-
tem is better than systems utilizing quasi-cyclic codes, since the cyclic shift property of
codewords may be exploited to diminish the complexity of attacks on the QC-MDPC based
cryptosystem [6]. As the SC-MDPC codes proposed here are no longer QC due to termina-
tion, classical decoding attacks on the SC-MDPC based cryptosystem have a work factor in
the order ofW (nz,k(z−d′−1), t), whereW (N,K,w) represents the number of elementary
operations needed to successfully search for codewords of weight w in a code with length N
and dimension K [7, 6]. Thus, SC-MDPC based cryptosystems are expected to be better
than QC-MDPC based cryptosystems against classical decoding attacks.
Key recovery attacks (KRA): These involve recovering the private key from the public
key and using the private key to decrypt the ciphertext. Even when the private key is not
exactly recovered, the attack may be successful if an alternate private key is found that can
successfully decode the ciphertext. In the proposed SC-MDPC cryptosystem, an attacker
can reconstuct H ′′(D) from the public key G′(D). H ′′(D) has row weight upper bounded
by (n− r+1)r!(rp)r . As H ′′(D) is expected to have inferior error correction performance
compared to the matrix H(D)with message passing decoding, one approach is to transform
H ′′(D) into a sparse matrix using matrix transformations. An alternative approach for the
KRA involves guessing the rows of the dual code using the public key G′(D). From [6, 37],
it can be shown that if the row weight of H(D) is pn, then the work factor for KRA attack
on the SC-MDPC system is in the order ofW (nz,rz− (n− r)(d′+1),np).
Example 4. Let H(D) be the 2×5 polynomial matrix
H(D) =
(
1+D+D25+D31+D50 D3+D30 D3+D17+D29 D+D32+D48 1+D4+D39+D50
D+D2+D30 D3+D27+D38 D2 D2+D23+D37 1+D+D44
)
.
Then wt( f )≤ p := 5 and deg( f )≤ d := 50 for all entries f of H(D). Choosing T =
(
1 1
0 1
)
and setting H ′(D) := TH(D), we obtain the associated generator matrix
G′(D) =

a1(D) a2(D) ∆(D) 0 0a3(D) a4(D) 0 ∆(D) 0
a5(D) a6(D) 0 0 ∆(D)

 ,
where
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Figure 1: Performance of the SC MDPC cryptosystem for both the intended receiver using
H(D), and an attacker using H ′′(D).
∆(D) = D3+D5+D27+D31+D32+D33+D34+D38+D39+D52+D53+D58+D60+D63+D69+D77+D88,
a1(D) = D
5+D6+D20+D30+D41+D44+D55+D56+D67,
a2(D) = D
2+D3+D4+D5+D18+D19+D27+D30+D31+D47+D52+D59,
a3(D) = D
4+D5+D26+D28+D32+D35+D39+D40+D51+D53+D59+D67+D70+D75+D86,
a4(D) = D
23+D24+D27+D31+D34+D37+D38+D48+D49+D50+D52+D54+D68+D73+D78+D87,
a5(D) = D
4+D7+D27+D30+D38+D47+D53+D66+D74+D88,
a6(D) = 1+D+D
5+D6+D25+D26+D30+D31+D32+D34+D40+D41+D44+D45+D50+D52+D75+D80+D94.
Thus the entries of G′(D) have maximal degree d′ = 94 (as opposed to the upper bound
dr = 502) and the sum of the weights of all entries is 98. Hence the key size is around
98 · log2(94) = 643 (as opposed to the upper bound (r(n− r)+ 1)r!(rp)
r log2(d
r)). The
final SC-MDPC code with generator matrix G′(D) obtained from the above construction
uses z = 2000. The overall block length is N = 5(2000) = 10000 bits and dimension K ∼
(n− r)z− (n− r)(d′ +1) = 5715. Using simulations, the value t = 140 was found to be a
good choice for the SC-MDPC cryptosystem with these parameters. Decoding via H(D)
using message passing decoder is able to correct errors of weight t. Using the analysis
in [6], we can show that for classical decoding attacks, the cryptosystem in Example 5.5
achieves> 280 level of security for t ∼ 140. However, for key recovery attacks, the minimum
row weight of the matrix H(D) in Example 4 is too small to guarantee the same security.
Denser parity check matrices (see Table 2 in [36]) are necessary to achieve a high level of
security against KRA and will result in a larger key size.
Figure 1 shows the performance of the SC-MDPC cryptosystem designed from Exam-
ple 4. The choice of entries in H(D) resulted in some isolated vertices in the Tanner graph
of the SC-MDPC code that were discarded. Thus, the overall blocklength is slightly less
than the intended block length of 10,000 bits, and the code rate is approximately 0.59. The
figure shows that the intended receiver can decode with low probability of error using a be-
lief propagation decoder when the number of injected errors during encryption is t ≤ 140.
14
An attacker who can construct H ′′(D) has probability ∼ 1 of failing to decode when the
number of bit errors injected during encryption is around 140 errors. Although no error
floor was observed in the simulation, error floor performance at very low block failure rates
of these codes with message passing decoding needs to be investigated further. This will
not change the attacker’s ability but could make the system less robust for the receiver.
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